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INTRODUCTION
Civil procedure is a significant subject in its own right as an integral part of the system of
justice, and one that any legal practitioner or student, or for that matter any learned observer,
must know to understand law. There are also many specialized reasons to study civil procedure,
and hence as many perspectives to emphasize in teaching it. What, then, should be the purposive
theme directing a course in civil procedure?
Championed Theme of the Civil Procedure Course. Students will eventually restudy civil
procedure when preparing for the bar examination. Likewise, lawyers must reapply themselves
to civil procedure in order to become litigators. But in structuring a basic course, the teacher
rightfully sets those aims aside. The basic course should be about laying a broad but solid
foundation. On the one hand, the bar examination tests details covered in the review courses that
all students eventually take. For example, many bar exams test on abstention (a complex doctrine
under which a federal court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction in deference to a state’s
interests), while few basic courses would reach that special doctrine. On the other hand, most
students do not become litigators, and those who do should acquire their knowledge and polish
their skills much later in their apprenticeship. Yet all students take a basic course in civil
procedure early in their studies, so something else must justify that course.
A teacher might view civil procedure as a key part of society’s array of dispute resolution
mechanisms, along with settlement, arbitration, and the like. Courts provide their procedure as a
default set of rules, one that will govern only if some other set of procedures does not trump by
operation of law or choice. Because almost all grievances conclude without judicial adjudication,
the teacher could justifiably view the “alternative” procedures as numerically more important
than traditional civil procedure. Thus, the course could serve as a social study of dispute
resolution.
Instead, the teacher might view civil procedure as the vehicle for the great cases’
reshaping of society, or view it as important mainly in the many undeniable ways that procedure
affects substantive law. In some senses, of course, the social impact of public law litigation is a
more important subject for study than one centered on today’s ordinary court cases in private
law.
The difficulty with teachers’ attraction to these admirable law-and-society concerns is
that such emphases fail to justify civil procedure’s position as a fundamental course in law
school, typically coming in the first year and often consuming a good number of credit hours.
Understanding the efficiency and fairness of society’s whole system for dispute resolution and
exploring the hidden impact of procedure on society’s substantive goals are both incredibly
important, but little reason exists for starting law study there. Advanced courses that focus on
them would be the way to go.
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The basic course should be more “basic” in theme and purpose, even if it should at least
touch on these more advanced ideas. What is the appropriate purposive theme for a basic course?
Of course, it should expose the students to the mechanics of the judicial branch, which is least
familiar to incoming students but most important when beginning law studies. But what is now
quite obvious to me, even if I took decades to realize it, is that the course works mainly to orient
the students in the structure of the whole legal system. That is the big picture for civil procedure!
I want to argue that the background constitutional structure should be, if it is not already,
the theme of the basic course in civil procedure. That theme will unify the doctrinal study, while
enriching what the students take away. More than any other course, civil procedure can convey
to beginning law students an understanding of their legal system:
Civil Procedure is one of the most complicated, but most enjoyable of the firstyear subjects, because it is your undeniable entrée into the world of law. In studying Civil
Procedure, you learn the blueprint of the American legal system, and slowly discover
how our entire system of civil justice fits together. Working through the rules to the point
of mastery can be a long and extraordinarily frustrating process, but when the clouds
finally do part, the elegant simplicity of the system of American civil procedure will be
yours to keep.1
It is in this principal sense that civil procedure serves the rest of the law school’s curriculum.
And it is this focus on structure that makes civil procedure one of the most central of legal
subjects in American academia—while in Europe, where civil procedure encompasses just the
mechanics, it is considered an inferior academic subject, with the course sometimes relegated to
a post-graduate practice program.
Sense of the Constitutional Structure. Okay, so what is this structure that the course
should aim at exposing? It is the constitutional structure within which the law constructs its civil
procedure. The constitutional space occupied by the architecture of civil procedure rests on a
foundation of the constitutional powers. But the permissible bounds of the space—the
compound’s floor, roof, and outer walls—emerge from the limits imposed by the Constitution.
The architect has a lot of freedom in designing civil procedure within that space, but must use the
existing powers strictly within those imposed limits. As the teacher and students explore and
dissect the architecture of civil procedure in this particular course, they come to comprehend
more generally how the rest of the legal system operates within the constitutional structure. The
laws of torts, contracts, property, and crime all work the same way, but the key ideas converge
and emerge in the course on civil procedure.
Now, I am not talking about constitutional doctrines that directly form part of civil
procedure, such as the Seventh Amendment’s preservation of a civil jury right for federal courts.
1

ROBERT H. MILLER, LAW SCHOOL CONFIDENTIAL 119 (rev. ed. 2004).
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In fact, civil procedure, unlike criminal or even administrative procedure, does not contain much
constitutional law of this kind in its foreground.2 Instead, what I am talking about is the
Constitution’s structural role, played more in the background.
Above all, I am not suggesting that civil procedure should be a wannabe course in
Constitutional Law or a stunted course on Federal Courts. The course’s concern should be more
structural than rights-based. It should be more focused on the political science aspects of
government generally, and less focused on federal subject-matter jurisdiction. In any event, the
subject of the course remains civil procedure. We are studying procedure, and these themes of
constitutional structure should remain very much in the background and at an introductory level.
But the proper study of procedure will help crystallize the students’ vague pre-existing
knowledge of governmental structure, and a small amount of attention given to constitutional
concerns will in turn illuminate the understanding of procedure and reveal its true importance.
Procedural due process might serve as an illustration of the constitutional structure that
underlies civil procedure. This doctrine, like equal protection, does concern how the government
must act rather than what it can or cannot do, which the other structural doctrines treat. The Due
Process Clauses dictate the minimally fair process that the government must provide when
impairing a person’s property or liberty interest. They require no more than a minimum. “To say
that a law does not violate the due process clause is to say the least possible good about it.”3 So
due process establishes only the floor, above which procedural law frames our living space. The
lawmaking architects build a law of civil procedure that delivers much more “good” than mere
due process. They seek thereby to achieve optimal policies and rules, within all constitutional
limits.
Doctrinal Framework of the Course. As for the rest of the constitutional structure, I shall
explain one part of it in a separate section of this Article on each of the doctrinal forays made
during the typical course. Most courses try to break down the subject of civil procedure along the
lines of an overview followed by a close inspection of certain major procedural problems. The
latter often include these four: governing law, authority to adjudicate, former adjudication, and
complex litigation. Such a selection of problems appropriately aims at informing students about
the legal system under which they live and in which they are beginning their study of law: one in
which the federal and state relation is key; one in which allocation of authority among the states
is key; one in which the separation of powers between the judiciary and other branches is key;
and one in which the capacity of the judiciary to adapt in handling new kinds of cases is key.

2

See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579 (1984)
(“Yet civil procedure—as important as [criminal or administrative procedure] and surely no
model of perfection—has remained relatively untouched [by the Constitution], even if the Court
does occasionally gnaw the familiar bone of personal jurisdiction doctrine.”).
3
Elliott E. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25
ARK. L. REV. 9, 25 (1971).
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Selection of these four problems is all the more appropriate because today they arise in an
increasingly complex and globalized setting, and so they remain fresh and important.
$

The overview of the stages of litigation introduces civil procedure by tracing the six
steps from commencing a lawsuit in some trial court to completing the final appeal in the
highest available appellate court: forum selection, pretrial practice, settlement process,
trial practice, judgment entry, and appeal practice. These mechanics of litigation appear
to the untutored as the totality of procedure, but in fact many proceduralists and many
procedure courses are mainly devoted instead to the four major problems lurking around
these mechanics. Nevertheless, exploring the mechanics at the outset serves to construct a
framework for the subject of civil procedure.

$

The topic of governing law examines a question that pervades the overview and deserves
systematic treatment: when should a court choose to apply the law of some sovereign
other than its own? This poses problems of interstate and international choice of law and
also problems involving the Erie4 doctrine that concerns the choice between federal and
state law.

$

The topic of authority to adjudicate treats a major problem of civil procedure that arises
at the start of the overview. There, it was probably assumed that the plaintiff had properly
selected a court with authority to adjudicate. In fact, that preliminary step can be a most
difficult and significant one. It involves satisfying three threshold requirements: subjectmatter jurisdiction, territorial authority to adjudicate, and notice. Moreover, these
requirements entail consideration of such subsumed matters as state and federal court
systems, territorial jurisdiction, venue, and service of process.

$

The topic of former adjudication studies a question that arises at the end of the
overview: what impact does a previously rendered adjudication have in subsequent
litigation? This question primarily entails problems of res judicata, a doctrine that
pursues finality in its specification of the effects to be given a judgment, the judicial
branch’s end-product.

$

The topic of complex litigation investigates the restrictions concerning which claims and
parties the litigants must or may join in their lawsuit. In the overview, it was generally
assumed that a single plaintiff was suing a single defendant on a single claim. In practice,
much more complex multiclaim and multiparty lawsuits enjoy ever-increasing frequency
and importance.

Integration of Constitutional Structure with Doctrinal Framework. Each section of this
Article will deliver the “Big Idea” behind the particular topic. I shall set out the constitutional
doctrine that I try to convey in essence to my students, along with a few representative
4

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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applications to civil procedure. Naturally, the course’s big ideas are interrelated and overlapping.
Each topic’s big idea, while self-contained, will accordingly lead into the next topic’s big idea.
Thus, this Article will progress through the relations among the branches of government, the
relations between the federal and state sovereigns, and the relations of state to state—whereby an
image of the Constitution will emerge as a joint-venture contract among thirteen independent
state sovereigns to create a federal government of limited and separated powers, with special
prominence in the contract given to its choice of law and choice of forum “clauses.” This Article
will then complete its progress through the big ideas by turning in particular to how the output of
the judicial branch in the form of nationwide-respected judgments determines that branch’s
distinctive nature—and finally by returning to consideration of how courts perform their function
by more than a minimally fair process. Let me here preview the journey:
$

The beginning of any civil procedure course traces the stages of litigation. To govern
those stages, the lawmakers seek optimal procedures, acting in response to the felt needs
for dispute resolution but also in pursuit of society’s outcome and process values. The
emergence of statutory authorization for judicial rulemaking shows that the procedural
lawmakers’ key first step is to resolve the proper roles of the legislature and the judiciary.
For example, study of federal procedure will inevitably involve a consideration of the
proper interplay of Congress and the courts, which takes place on the constitutional
terrain of separation of powers.

$

Next, I move to governing law. The Framers had concerns about interstate choice of law.
But over time, the more critical question has emerged as to what they had to say about the
choice of law between federal and state regimes. The choice-of-law “clause” of the
constitutional contract is in fact so prominent that it becomes useful to view the
Constitution centrally as a choice-of-law agreement, with the states here giving such-andsuch to the federal government but retaining this-and-that for state law, and so on through
the document. The Constitution’s preoccupation with the relation between federal and
state law, as well as the subsequent development of all the subconstitutional law on the
subject, justifies treating as a big idea the subject of vertical federalism.

$

The prior attention to interstate, or horizontal, choice of law smooths the transition to
authority to adjudicate. Although attention is owing to federal/state and even
international division of authority, the centerpiece here is allocation of authority among
the states. When can New York handle matters of considerable concern to New Jersey?
The big idea accordingly shifts to the Constitution’s structure for territorial jurisdiction,
built in the United States on the notion of horizontal federalism.

$

The next topic of former adjudication enmeshes the students in the essence of the judicial
branch. Res judicata is the doctrine that defines a judgment, which is the output of the
judicial branch. By its definition, a judgment decides certain things and does not decide
other things. The court acts against only the parties before it and a very limited set of
others. This feature gives the judicial branch its distinctive nature. By contrast, where a
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court has authority to speak, it speaks with real authority. And that authority is, at the
least, nationwide. That is, we enjoy the benefits of a legally unified nation thanks to the
notion of full faith and credit.
$

Finally, the topic of complex litigation starts to come back to “procedure” stricto sensu.
The big idea here is using the justification of adequate representation to extend the
binding effects of a judgment to more nonparties. Procedural law puts severe limits on
such extension, because society wants to preserve the distinctive nature of adjudication.
Moreover, the Constitution puts an absolute limit on how far law can extend the binding
effects. To perceive that outer limit, the focus must return to procedural due process.

I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
A course’s overview traces the stages of litigation. Such an overview of federal procedure
will inevitably involve a consideration of the proper interplay of Congress and the federal courts.
That interplay takes place on the constitutional terrain of separation of powers.5
A. Constitutional Doctrine
Separation of powers was the Framers’ great horizontal theme for government. By
contrast, federalism treats the vertical relationship between the new federal government and the
existing state sovereigns.
For the separation theme, the Framers mainly drew on John Locke’s Second Treatise of
Government (1690) and especially Baron de Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1748) in
implementing their theory of three offsetting branches of government, a theory previously
pioneered by the states and subsequently elaborated by James Madison in The Federalist (1788).
The Constitution does not explicitly invoke the theory, but the theory pervades the document’s
construction. The most obvious manifestation appears in its devoting Article I to the legislature,
Article II to the executive, and Article III to the judiciary. But the Constitution was far from
definitive or complete on the details of the subject.
So, how to read the Constitution? The Framers’ motivating idea was that separation
would result not only in less law, but also in less arbitrary law, than if power were concentrated.
Although their construction of the three separate articles suggested a formalist notion of separate
spheres of authority for the three branches, the functionalist reality has meant partially
overlapping spheres. Competition among the branches in the overlaps helps to ensure adequate
checks and balances, and hence an optimal separation of powers.

5
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Harriger ed., 2003).
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How has the idea worked out? The doctrine has worked to limit government, but perhaps
not as much as the Framers hoped because of the many unforeseen changes over time, such as
the rise of administrative agencies and the modern prevalence of party politics. The case law on
separation of powers has turned out rather spongy. Actual applications of the doctrine depend
heavily on context. The cases’ approach seems to allow shared power unless a branch’s core
function is endangered or unless the Constitution’s text actually committed the particular task to
one branch.
Over the course of history, the big confrontations over separation of powers have arisen
between the executive and the legislature.6 In the field of civil procedure, however, the interest
lies more with contests between the legislature and the judiciary. So let us focus on the relevant
text in that latter regard.
The separateness is exemplified by the main provisions. Article I, Section 1 of the
Federal Constitution provides:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Article III, Section 1 provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
That last sentence giving federal judges life tenure is indicative of the general directive that each
branch should stay out of another branch’s business. Symmetrical provisions lie in such clauses
as Article I, Section 5 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”)
and Article I, Section 6 (“and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place”).
The overlap of the branches’ business, however, shows up in Article I, Section 8:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court; . . . —And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this

6

See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating
President Truman’s wartime seizure of the nation’s major steel mills).
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Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.
Moreover, Article III, Section 2, after laying out the categories of cases and controversies
beyond which Congress cannot extend the federal courts’ “judicial power,” provides specifically
as to the United States Supreme Court:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
So, the Constitution gives Congress the power to create lower federal courts, thus implicitly
giving it plenty of authority to dictate their jurisdiction. That is quite an overlap between
branches. The resulting tensions, which were intended to energize separation of powers, nicely
emerge by a closer look at this realm of subject-matter jurisdiction.
First, it is true that courts exercise power throughout their jurisdiction. But, except for the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the granting of jurisdiction is a legislative function.
The courts have generally respected that assignment to Congress7—even if the Court has
approved occasional wanderings, most notably in its approval of judge-created pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction in the period before Congress recaptured the area by its 1990 statute
bestowing supplemental jurisdiction.8
The scheme, then, is clear: most federal-court jurisdiction does not exist until Congress
bestows it. Article III’s sketching of the “judicial power” represents an outer limit on
congressional power, not a grant of power itself. Congress has exercised its Article I power
through a whole series of jurisdictional statutes. However, out of congressional concern for
maintaining a healthy federalism, these statutes fall far short of bestowing all of the federal
judicial power under the Constitution. Thus, when considering an issue of federal jurisdiction,
one must refer first to the congressional enactment on jurisdiction and then to the constitutional
limit on the judicial power; for such jurisdiction to exist, the particular case generally must fall
within the bounds of both.
The Constitution gives Congress a fairly free hand in withholding or withdrawing from
the lower federal courts original jurisdiction over the enumerated “cases” and “controversies”

7

See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (holding that Congress has
authority to regulate the mode of executing on judgments).
8
28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics—A Half
Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 BYU L. REV. 767.
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within the federal judicial power.9 Similarly, Articles I and III appear to confide the appellate
jurisdiction of the federal courts largely to congressional control. Are there any limits on the
jurisdiction-stripping that Congress can inflict on the federal courts? Imagine that Congress tried
to keep school-prayer cases and appeals out of those courts henceforth. Congress has not
attempted much like that, so the law is uncertain, although potentially of great political import. In
fact, some constitutional limitations seem to exist, based on notions of preserving the courts’
essential functions under the Constitution or observing specific rights recognized elsewhere in
the Constitution, but those limitations are surely vague and fairly slight.10
Second, moving from this example of exclusive legislative authority, we pass over the
difficult question of the extent to which Congress can give Article III functions to bodies outside
the judicial branch, and we pause on the converse question of whether Congress can authorize
the courts to exercise some of the legislative power by delegation.11 As an example, Congress
established the United States Sentencing Commission to issue guidelines for criminal sentences.
Three of the seven commissioners were to be sitting federal judges, thus mingling the branches.
The Court held that the legislature could delegate, and the judiciary could accept, such
nonadjudicatory functions of rulemaking “that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another
Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary.”12
Third, to complete the spectrum of governmental power possessed by legislature and
judiciary, there is some core of exclusive judicial authority, out of which the legislature must
stay. The example here is a congressional statute that required federal courts to reopen final
judgments already rendered in certain securities actions, namely, ones dismissed under the
statute of limitations after the Supreme Court had abruptly changed the limitations law. The
Court ruled that this command violated separation of powers:
Article III establishes a “judicial department” with the “province and duty . . . to say what
the law is” in particular cases and controversies. The record of history shows that the
Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department with an expressed understanding
that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide
9

See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding a congressional
statute repealing a portion of habeas corpus jurisdiction).
10
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (overturning a congressional
statute suspending a portion of habeas corpus jurisdiction). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.2 (discussing congressional control of Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction), § 3.3 (discussing congressional control of lower federal courts’ jurisdiction) (5th
ed. 2007); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (7th ed.
2011).
11
See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (holding that non-Article III bankruptcy
judge could not hear a tort counterclaim brought by Anna Nicole Smith); WRIGHT & KANE,
supra note 10, § 11.
12
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388 (1989).
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them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy . . . . By
retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has
violated this fundamental principle.13
B. Application to Stages of Litigation
1. Spectrum of Power for Procedural Lawmaking
To govern the stages of litigation, the lawmakers seek to develop optimal procedures.
Most of the resulting law of procedure lies in fact outside the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
principally generated by legislatures as statutes or by courts either in the course of ordinary
decisionmaking or by exercise of the various authorizations to issue court rules.
The history of procedure shows that the lawmakers’ key first step is to resolve the proper
roles of the legislature and the judiciary. Much turns on who in theory can do a better job, and
even more so on whom experience has shown to have done better. Legislatures and courts are
certainly not equivalent lawmakers.
Legislatures are often thought of as lawmakers par excellence in modern societies. They
embody the voice of the demos, constituting the supreme lawmaker within constitutional limits
but answering to the people. And they are well equipped to make certain kinds of law. First,
unlike courts as we traditionally know them, a legislature can set up committees and
commissions to investigate social problems in depth and in breadth, preparatory to making law.
Second, a legislature can act on its own initiative, and it can deal with more aspects of a social
problem at one time than can a court. Third, when a court does act definitively, this will usually
have a retroactive effect, whereas a legislature may better secure fairness by acting
prospectively. Fourth, in general a court’s decision coercively binds only the parties, whereas a
legislature can speak directly to the populace as a whole. Fifth, what a court decides to do about
a social problem might be buried in a mass of arcane law reports, whereas a legislature can adopt
methods of promulgation and publicity better designed to get the word around and thus to allow
the citizenry to conform their conduct. Sixth, courts do not have all the methods for dealing with
a social problem that legislatures have, including the funding of a solution. Seventh, legislatures
can act without the restrictions of the theoretical expectations we traditionally impose on courts,
such as drawing only principled distinctions and not working obviously major social changes.
Yet, as makers of certain other kinds of law, courts have important advantages over
legislatures. First, impartially applying law to new situations is a task that legislators are
distinctly unsuited to perform. Second, generating interstitial law usually cannot await the
possibility of the legislature returning to the subject. Third, even as a wholly original matter, if
neither legislature nor court has had much prior experience with a social problem, letting the
13

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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courts wrestle with the problem on a case-by-case basis may be best, testing general propositions
against the reality of concrete situations. Fourth, courts may be better suited to originate law that
turns on many factors or on commonsense solutions framed in terms of familiar everyday moral
concepts such as blame. Fifth, if the courts have done much of the original work in developing
an area of the law, allowing them to continue the evolutionary task of clarifying and reshaping
that law may be preferable. Sixth, when the issue is not one on which political parties divide,
there is less reason for insisting that it be resolved in the first instance by a legislative body.
Seventh, the issue may instead be one that has become a political football within the legislative
body, but clearly ought not to be left that way, or one as to which the majoritarian process of
legislatures would fail to protect the interests of certain small groups within society.
An alternative answer to this legislature-versus-court problem is the administrative body
empowered to make governing regulations within a basic framework hewn by the legislature. In
returning from the foregoing very general political-science considerations to the context of
making procedural law, the analogy to administrative lawmaking lies in the modern emergence
of statutory authorization for judicial rulemaking.14
All this discussion really concerns the notion of division of labor, however. To get back
to separation of powers, one should ask not who would do the job better, but who must do certain
jobs by constitutional requirement. The separation of powers as to procedural lawmaking falls on
the same tripartite spectrum that runs from exclusive legislative power through delegated power
to exclusive court power.
The resultant pattern of procedure for the federal system is as follows: (1) The legislature
has very broad power to regulate the courts’ civil procedure (e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence,
which was enacted as a statute by Congress). Although the courts themselves have overlapping
power to regulate their own civil procedure by lawmaking, either by judicial decision or by court
rulemaking, they act at the sufferance of and subject to the ultimate control of the legislature
(e.g., res judicata),15 and they must stay out of certain areas (e.g., subject-matter jurisdiction).16
(2) The courts also have power to regulate their own civil procedure by rulemaking pursuant to a
proper delegation of legislative power (e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which was
promulgated by the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act).17 (3) Finally, the courts have
power to regulate their own civil procedure by lawmaking within a narrow inherent judicial

14

See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2(C)(2) (2d ed. 2009).
See Benjamin Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The Legislature’s Relation to Judicial RuleMaking: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1951) (arguing that the
legislature has authority to override court-promulgated rules by statute, as a check on the
judiciary).
16
See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
17
See Michael Blasie, Note, A Separation of Powers Defense of Federal Rulemaking
Power, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 593 (2011).
15
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power to conduct the courts’ own business (e.g., discipline of individual attorneys for
misconduct before the courts).18
2. Outer Bounds for Legislature and Judiciary
The legislature cannot act in derogation of the judiciary’s inherent power. Nor can it act
in violation of the Constitution. The latter limitation brings to mind the most obvious of controls
on the legislative branch, that being judicial review. Courts usually can strike down legislation
that transgresses constitutional limits.19
A symmetrical control on the judiciary is Article III’s restriction of courts’ activity to
“case and controversy.”20 This justiciability restriction comes up in connection with the limited
authorization of declaratory judgments, which one studies against the backdrop of the
constitutional requirement of ripeness and prohibition of advisory opinions. The motive behind
the Constitution’s telling courts to stay away from abstract questions is both to improve the
judicial function and to protect the other branches from intrusion. First, courts as we know them
will perform better if they decide based on focused facts presented by interested adversaries;
moreover, permitting only concrete disputes will keep many actions out of court, so allowing
courts to handle their business effectively. Second, the justiciability limitation keeps courts out
of prospective lawmaking, which is not the assigned task of the judiciary. In any event,
justiciability has generated an immense body of law, which clusters under the additional
doctrines of standing, mootness, and political questions.
Standing doctrine comprises a complicated mass of law, which nevertheless does
important work in restraining the courts to stay within the judicial realm of adjudicating
individualized disputes. Constitutional standing requires that the plaintiff complain of a
personalized and direct injury in fact. Courts have, also, some discretion to decline jurisdiction
when the plaintiff is poorly positioned to present the action, as when the plaintiff is primarily
asserting the rights of others. This so-called prudential overlay goes beyond the requirements of
Article III, but helps to ensure that the judiciary does not too actively oversee the executive
function.
Mootness doctrine is a little more self-evident in meaning, although drawing the line still
proves difficult in practice. It provides that there is no case or controversy once the dispute has
been resolved. This is the other side of the ripeness doctrine and rests on the same reasons of
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fostering the judicial function and insulating the legislative function. Similarly, parties cannot
collude to produce a dispute.
Finally, the political question doctrine most nicely stands as a counterpoint to judicial
review. It holds that certain matters are so enmeshed in the other branches’ concerns that a court
will not review their acts to test for constitutionality. This does not mean that the acts are not
subject to the Constitution, but only that the duties of interpreting and implementing the
Constitution lie with the political branches. The leading case defined the scope of the political
question doctrine in these terms:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has
one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of
powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.21

II. VERTICAL FEDERALISM
I now move on to governing law. The Constitution’s preoccupation with the relation
between federal and state law, as well as the subsequent development of all the subconstitutional
law on the subject, justifies treating as a big idea the subject of federalism.22
A. Constitutional Doctrine
While separation of powers was the Framers’ great horizontal theme for government,
they hit upon federalism to build the vertical relationship between the new federal government
and the existing state sovereigns. For the theory of federalism, they drew on various political
experiments in the governance of the British Empire. But their Constitution was the first attempt
to institutionalize this system of government. “The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”23
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The definition of federalism is a governmental system by which its people live under the
authority of more than one sovereign. To create such a system, there must be some zone of
constitutionally entrenched decentralized power, where the constitutive sovereign can act
without being subject to the central sovereign’s override. That zone is what permits us to speak
of there being more than one sovereign.
Distinguish the system of unitary government, adopted in countries like France or
England. There people lived under a single sovereign. Such a central authority might be partially
decentralized, so that certain powers are exercised by local authorities. But those local authorities
are under the dictate of the central, unitary authority. Indeed, such decentralization is often a
sound idea. It can deliver many of the advantages often associated with federalism—like
localized governmental responsiveness, increased citizen involvement, and policy
experimentation and competition. That possibility of reaping advantages by decentralization
raises the question of why the Framers instead went the federalism route.
First, federalism was their solution for meeting the states’ sovereignty demands and for
reconciling multiple political identities. The states would not agree to a union without a
compromise to ensure their continued existence. Citizens strongly identified with their state,
probably more so than with the new nation. Today, seriously divided identity may no longer
prevail, but its resolution was an original aim of federalism.
Second, another big aim of the Framers was to limit the powers of the federal government
being created. Recall that their belief was that divided authority would result not only in less law,
but also in less arbitrary law, than if powers were concentrated. So, federalism was to work in
tandem with separation of powers to restrain the federal government.
Third, at the same time the Framers wanted to ensure that the federal government had
enough power to avoid the paralyzing problems of an overly weak central government. The
Constitution was the attempt to cure the shortcomings experienced under the Articles of
Confederation.
Obviously, then, federalism was born of tension to live a life of tension. Under such a
system, the question will always exist as to whether the state should be left to govern a certain
matter or whether the federal government was allowed to assert itself on the matter. In fact, the
unresolvable tension sometimes leaves both conservatives and liberals at sea, when their views
on states’ rights come into conflict with their policy preferences regarding the matter.
So, how to read the Constitution? Theory evokes a notion of separate spheres of
authority for the two levels, but the reality is partially overlapping spheres.24 The appropriate
realms are observed through a variety of techniques, comprising not only judicially enforced
24

See Ernest A. Young, What Does It Take to Make a Federal System? On Constitutional
Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831 (2010) (book review).

16
prohibitions, but also political pressures protecting state interests. Indeed, federalism is largely
enforced by Congress, where states are ensured representation, including equal representation in
the Senate. Also, the various speed bumps in the process for making laws has a braking effect on
hegemony. Moreover, even in the absence of compulsion or impediment, the creation of
subconstitutional federal law that defers to state interests and the enactment of state law that
asserts state interests help to keep federalism alive and well.
Courts do have a role in policing the legislatures, but perform it in largely ineffectual
ways. For example, courts in theory limit Congress to the spheres of enumerated powers in
Article I. However, over time the Supreme Court has loosely interpreted those powers, while
giving full play to the authorization to Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers. It has read “necessary” to mean
convenient rather than indispensable.25 Thus, Congress can use any reasonable means to
effectuate an enumerated power, with reasonable implying a balancing test that asks if a proper
federal interest is wildly outweighed by state interests. The effect, or lack of effect, of judicial
policing is seen best in the incredible growth of Congress’s commerce power over the course of
the nation’s history.
In search of an alternative way to police Congress, the Court has established some limits
on the ways that Congress in exercising its wide powers can impinge on state sovereignty. By the
anti-commandeering doctrine, the Court says that Congress cannot directly make the state
executive or legislature perform governmental acts.26 An analogous kind of limitation is state
sovereign immunity, which forbids private suits for money damages against states.27
The Tenth Amendment, acting more as a summary of constitutional structure than as an
independent limitation, puts it this way;
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
On the other side of the federalism equation—ensuring the federal government adequate
powers by restricting state powers—there is actual operative constitutional text to consult. It lies
in the all-important Supremacy Clause of Article VI:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
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Accordingly, if Congress passes a statute within its powers, it will preempt any state law that
directly collides with the statute.
How has the idea of federalism worked out? The problem of dueling dual political
identities has receded for modern Americans. The doctrine has worked to limit government,
although perhaps not as much as the Framers hoped. It certainly has not worked to prevent a
great rise of the federal authority. But there is also no denying that a very real existence of both
state and federal governments, along with many resulting tensions, has persisted for over two
centuries. So, federalism has worked out okay.
While the advantages of federalism may be only arguable, it surely seems terribly
complicated, in a way so typical of American law. However, there is nothing peculiarly
American here. Federalism is today a common form of political organization around the world,
with Canada and Germany being ready examples (as well as the European Union itself).28 Some
of those regimes make federalism somewhat less complicated, as by having only one hierarchy
of courts. But other of federalism’s complications are unavoidable. In particular, because
federalism involves the people living under the authority of more than one sovereign, the
problem of choosing between state and federal law is inevitably ubiquitous in any form of
federalism.29
B. Application to Governing Law
1. Limitation on Federal Power
Federalism concerns underlie every legal question that arises in this country. We can see
this best in connection with the topic of governing law. In particular, we can ask what the limits
are on the federal government in choosing to govern a matter by federal law.30
As an introductory example, think of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which Congress enacted in
1990:
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [supplemental jurisdiction]
shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed
unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
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Congress thus enlarged the period that a state-law claim could be brought in state court after the
claim’s dismissal from federal court. Did the Constitution permit Congress so to affect the
conduct of litigation in state court? Yes, according to a unanimous Supreme Court.31 Congress
has broad powers from Articles I and III to create and regulate federal courts. The Necessary and
Proper Clause effectively broadens them further. This collateral regulation of state courts was
“necessary” because it was conducive to the administration of justice and plainly adapted to that
end. By § 1367(d), Congress was pursuing federal interests of not discouraging resort to federal
courts by litigants who would otherwise fear a fatal failure to establish jurisdiction and not
discouraging federal judges from dismissing cases better suited for state court, while
discouraging plaintiffs from seeking insurance by double filing in both federal and state court
and discouraging defendants from wastefully and unfairly delaying an objection to jurisdiction.
Those interests were not outweighed by state interests, because the strong one of providing
repose from stale claims suffers little impingement, given that the federal suit still had to have
been filed within the state’s limitations period.
Congress likewise could legislate on many other matters that arise in the civil procedure
course. It could, for example, pass a statute to reform the territorial jurisdiction of state courts. It
could found that action on the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or the
Commerce Clause, while buttressing its effort to cover state courts’ international litigation by
reference to congressional powers over foreign relations.32 I believe that congressional reform of
the states’ territorial jurisdiction would be a good idea. However, Congress has shown next to no
inclination to do anything of the kind.
If Congress were to show such an inclination, there would be some limits. For example,
consider congressional authority to legislate on the operation of state courts in handling state-law
cases. Congress would face no problem in regulating procedure for federal-law claims brought in
state court, but it would really be stretching to enact a procedural code for all actions in state
court. Wholesale displacement of state procedure would indeed be constitutionally troubling.33
Naturally, constitutional limits on the other branches of the federal government would be the
same or, in all theoretical likelihood, more restrictive.34

31

Jinks v. Richland Cnty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456 (2003).
See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 89, 110, 124-29 (1999).
33
See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947, 950-51 (2001) (arguing that Congress cannot regulate state-court procedures for enforcing
state-law cases); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Congressional Power and State Court
Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949 (2006) (extending the focus to congressional control of state-court
jurisdiction in state-law cases). But see Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to
Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV.
71, 75-90 (1998) (arguing for an intrusive role for federal law).
34
See CLERMONT, supra note 14, § 3.2(A)(1).
32

19
2. Limitation on State Power
In contrast to the wide ineffectiveness of the formal limitations on federal power, the
Supremacy Clause would appear to makes the limitations on the states’ power extremely
effective. The doctrine of preemption guarantees as much.
Yet, surprisingly, federalism has kept the federal government from capitalizing on the
states’ theoretical weakness. Today, states have a broad range of power, and their laws govern
much of our lives. In many regulatory areas, a mixture of state and federal law governs.
Federalism apparently works because the sovereigns want to make it work, rather than their
being compelled to make it work.35
The best examples lie in the operation of the Erie doctrine. Although Congress could
make federal law into the governing law for most situations, it has not. Political and process
restraints, as well as good or at least accepted policy, have worked to protect state interests. In
the absence of such a congressional command, the courts have chosen to defer to state law—
broadly in state courts under the judicial approach to preemption and reverse-Erie, and more
broadly in federal courts than they have to.36
This reality of practice, which reveals deference against the background of lenient
constitutional command, makes Erie the ideal topic for studying vertical federalism in action.

III. Horizontal Federalism
As we reach the middle of this Article’s five “big ideas,” I should emphasize that each of
the big ideas shows up in connection with every topic. That is why they are big ideas. In the
topic of authority to adjudicate, the pervasiveness became obvious. The initial subtopic of
subject-matter jurisdiction turns on both (1) separation of powers and (2) vertical federalism, the
former predominant in the existence of legislative power to bestow jurisdiction on the federal
courts and the latter predominant in the extent to which Congress has actually bestowed federal
jurisdiction at the expense of state courts. The central subtopic of territorial authority to
adjudicate pulls in (3) full faith and credit. The final subtopic of notice clearly entails the study
of (4) procedural due process.
But this topic’s biggest idea arises in connection with the horizontal allocation of
territorial adjudicatory authority among the state sovereigns. When can New York handle
matters of considerable concern to New Jersey? The big-idea focus accordingly shifts to the
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Constitution’s structure for territorial jurisdiction, built in the United States on the notion of (5)
horizontal federalism.37
A. Constitutional Doctrine
Both horizontal federalism and vertical federalism were necessary ingredients for thirteen
nation-states to get together and form a union. They needed not only to establish the new federal
government of separated and limited powers coexisting with state powers, but also to regulate
the horizontal relations among the states. Interstate relations had not prospered under the Articles
of Confederation. Each state came into the Constitutional Convention intent on keeping the other
states from inflicting more harm. But the Constitution would treat the states as equals, imposing
no priority rule comparable to the Supremacy Clause’s role in vertical federalism. Therefore, the
colliding powers of multiple equals would foreseeably produce deleterious effects, with each
state impinging on other states and their citizens.
Horizontal federalism was the expression of the Framers’ attempt to help the states to live
together. It therefore differs in aim from vertical federalism. It has worked well, if one overlooks
the Civil War. The years have seen a marked decrease in the psychological and legal significance
of state borders.
Another difference between horizontal and vertical federalism is that the constitutional
mechanisms for controlling colliding state powers generally work more by prohibition than by
cooperation. But cooperation is not totally off the table. States can negotiate their coexistence
through the political process in Congress. Also, the Interstate Compact Clause in Article I,
Section 10 authorizes a state to enter an “Agreement or Compact with another State” given the
consent of Congress.
Although their ends and means thus differ, horizontal federalism nevertheless overlaps
with vertical federalism. The reason is that enablement of federal authority, together with
disablement of state authority, is the major technique for restraining state power on a horizontal
level. For example, the states lost their right to print their own money in 1789.
So, how precisely to define horizontal federalism? This doctrine comprises a diverse set
of constitutional mechanisms for ameliorating the interstate conflicts or tensions that would
inevitably result from union. The best way to convey horizontal federalism’s set of mechanisms
is by giving additional examples.38
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The Commerce Clause empowered the federal government in economic matters. Even in
its unexercised or dormant condition, the clause was read to knock the states out of the zone of
regulating interstate commerce. This so-called Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state
discrimination against out-of-state goods and services. It has thereby headed off internal trade
wars and created a common market for this country.
In connection with authority to adjudicate one sees another example of how horizontal
federalism protects one state from another. Subject-matter jurisdictional provisions such as
diversity jurisdiction, along with the removal statutes, comfort each state with the knowledge
that its citizens can escape sister-state courts to a neutral federal forum.
That last example clarifies that horizontal federalism works not only on the state-to-state
level but also protects sister-state citizens. States must treat out-of-state individuals equally and
fairly. The anti-discrimination principle finds express statement in Article IV, Section 2: “The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.” In connection with authority to adjudicate one sees another example of how horizontal
federalism protects the individual, namely, by federal enforcement of the fairness principle
through the Due Process Clause.
The subject that most nicely exposes the workings of horizontal federalism is interstate
territorial authority to adjudicate. The preceding topic’s introduction to interstate, or horizontal,
choice of law smoothed the transition to study of territorial authority to adjudicate. The next
topic will continue the theme of horizontal federalism in connection with full faith and credit for
judgments. But here the study is of state-court territorial jurisdiction.
B. Application to Authority to Adjudicate
1. Evolution of Territorial Jurisdiction
The states came into the Constitutional Convention as sovereigns. The Convention’s
product left them sovereigns—except to the extent they surrendered sovereign rights in 1789 or
by later constitutional amendments. Horizontal federalism embodies both these ideas of
sovereignty and surrendered sovereignty.
A full sovereign can do whatever it wants, having the raw force to adjudicate any dispute
when, and how, it pleases, as well as the capability to enforce its adjudication on persons and
extraterritorial transactions, to regulate local commerce in a manner that affects actors or markets
in other states, or to discriminate between in-state citizens and out-of-state citizens when
administering government programs. In each scenario, the question is whether a state has
exceeded a limit on its power that exists because of its status as only one of fifty co-equal entities
that must govern within limits created by the existence of the other forty-nine.”).
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things over which it eventually acquires physical control. The need for enforcement proves that
territorial boundaries sometimes matter, but otherwise anything goes. True, international law has
long envisaged some limit on that raw force, such as the requirement of an adequate connection
between the judgment-rendering sovereign and the target of litigation. But the only force behind
international law lay in authorizing a second sovereign’s refusal to give effect to a foreign
judgment that had failed to observe international standards.
In phase one of the American experience, the states surrendered some of their sovereignty
by agreeing to the Constitution. But it was by no means clear what the Constitution’s version of
horizontal federalism intended as to the states’ territorial jurisdiction, a topic a good deal less
prominent then than it is now. No constitutional clause treated that topic. Instead, the states
agreed to a Full Faith and Credit Clause regarding judgments, and Congress soon passed an
implementing statute, but the clause and statute were not very clear either.39 Perhaps states would
treat sister-state judgments in the manner of domestic judgments’ automatic recognition, or
perhaps states would give them the scant regard owing foreign-nation judgments. In fact, the
courts right after the Founding hit upon a compromise between those Federalist and AntiFederalist positions: states were to give full effect to sister-state judgments, but they retained the
right to test them for satisfaction of the international-law standard for territorial jurisdiction (or
rather the standard as interpreted by American courts in their home-grown power test).40 Thus,
horizontal federalism developed a means for one state to check the jurisdictional overreaching by
another state, that is, as a way to protect state sovereignty from impingement by a sister state.
Exercise of this indirect control launched the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction on the road to its
modern prominence.
In phase two came the Civil War—along with the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868
fundamentally altering federalism. Ten years later, Pennoyer41 recognized the seismic shift. It
began to move the focus of concern from state-to-state sovereignty toward the state-to-person
limits on state power to infringe personal rights. That move caused the Court to invoke the
Substantive Due Process Clause.42 The Court would use that clause to assert federal protection
for fundamental private rights, although in the coming laissez-faire era the Court would invoke
those rights mainly to tell government what it could not do. This switch in use from full faith and
credit to substantive due process meant that, while previously a state was free to invoke
international-law standards to deny effect to a sister-state judgment, now the affected person
could make the second state treat the judgment as invalid or even stop the first proceeding in the
rendering state. Henceforth, the second state’s checking of the rendering state’s jurisdiction came
to mean applying the jurisdictional law that was applicable in the rendering state itself.
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In phase three came the New Deal—along with its jolting of the Constitution with the
realization that government action and inaction were not neutral. A decade later, International
Shoe43 recognized the shift by starting the move from the power test toward a fairness test, still
under the banner of the Due Process Clause. The Court acted in a social-welfare spirit to explore
what government could do to protect the individual. It perceived that the location of litigation
impacted the distribution of societal resources. It stepped in to site litigation appropriately.
Ironically, however, subsequent cases ended up with the view that the fairness test supplements
the power test rather than replaces it, a resolution that has worked to the advantage of probusiness interests.
The complicated doctrine that resulted in cases like Shaffer,44 and that prevails today by
the cumulative testing for power and unreasonableness, sets the stage for arguing about the law
of tomorrow. The courts are still at work on defining the law of territorial jurisdiction.
The important lesson is that although the law of territorial jurisdiction is an important
component of the nation’s horizontal federalism, this component has evolved a great deal over
the course of the nation’s constitutional history. Studied apart from the constitutional structure,
territorial jurisdiction is incomprehensible. With the proper background, however, the law in its
current form actually makes sense: the federal suprasovereign arguably should ensure that states
both observe the limits on their power and avoid treating individuals unreasonably. But no one
should expect that this law has arrived at its destination and so will remain unchanged in the
future.
2. Extension to International Jurisdiction
Viewing territorial jurisdiction in the context of the constitutional structure makes
international jurisdiction easier to understand too.
The background again is that modern sovereigns are able to do whatever they wish to do,
other than enforcing their judgments abroad. International law envisages some limit on that raw
force, including a requirement of adequate connection between the sovereign and the target of
the action. But all that international law can do is allow the second sovereign to refuse effect to a
foreign-nation judgment for failure to observe international standards. This is only an indirect
control on territorial jurisdiction. In other words, the world today is in the pre-Constitution
condition of clashing sovereigns. The situation is therefore one of horizontal relations rather than
horizontal federalism.
Looking back on the American experience, our courts at the time of the Founding were
willing to abide by their view of international law’s constraint. That is, American courts abided
43
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by their power test when asserting their own jurisdiction. Before honoring foreign-nation
judgments, American courts would test the rendering court’s jurisdiction by application of the
power test. But, anyway, the only effect they gave to foreign-nation judgments was an evidential
effect. The judgment would be admissible as sufficient or prima facie evidence, in the sense that
a plaintiff seeking enforcement could introduce a foreign-nation judgment to show there was
presumptively a judgment debt, but the defendant could then induce full and free reexamination
of the merits of the claim to show no debt was owing.45
The turning point was the decision in Hilton v. Guyot.46 By that 1895 case, the U.S.
Supreme Court shifted our approach to comity. Henceforth, based on policy-based deference
rather than legal compulsion, the United States would choose in general to treat foreign-nation
judgments as states treat sister-state judgments. The United States retained, however, the right to
test for satisfaction of basic notions of U.S. due process. The Hilton regime is the U.S. law of
today for international litigation. Note that it essentially accords with the pre-Civil War regime
among U.S. states.
The United States would like to induce equal treatment of U.S. judgments abroad. The
much-discussed treaty possibilities would go even farther.47 This discussion reveals the proposed
treaty as an attempt to bring the international regime into closer accord with the regime
prevailing today in the United States under horizontal federalism. The idea would be for the
world’s countries to agree on basic rules for territorial jurisdiction, as the United States achieved
by imposition of the Due Process Clause from above onto the states. The difficulty is in getting
agreement despite the world’s disagreements over the themes of power and fairness. But once
achieved, that agreement would allow the countries’ agreeing to respect each other’s judgments,
as the United States achieved by imposition of full faith and credit provisions from above onto
the states.
The sobering note sounds upon recalling the many years, conflicts, and confusions
required to push the United States through its constitutional and jurisdictional history. The failure
to reach a treaty so far becomes much more understandable. And the barriers to eventual
agreement appear much higher. But they are not insurmountable. The European Union proved as
much, when its member countries agreed to their own scheme of horizontal federalism.48

IV. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
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The topic of former adjudication leads the student to consider the essence of the judicial
branch. The judiciary’s output is in the form of a judgment, and res judicata is the doctrine that
defines the judgment. For its effects, one looks to the notion of full faith and credit, which yields
the benefits of a legally unified nation.49
A. Constitutional Doctrine
The rules for recognizing and enforcing a nondomestic judgment are in considerable part
obligatory on American courts when that judgment comes from another American court. When
the prior judgment was rendered by a state court and the second action is brought in a court of
another state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1 of the Federal
Constitution applies:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.
The First Congress passed implementing legislation, as the Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat.
122:
That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be authenticated by
having the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the records and judicial
proceedings of the courts of any state, shall be proved or admitted in any other court
within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed,
if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding
magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said
records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.
The Revisers of the Judicial Code in 1948, with the intent of making no substantive change,
rephrased that statute as 28 U.S.C. § 1738:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of
49
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the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that
the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
Courts have read Constitution and statute together to require the second court to give the same
binding effect to a valid and final judgment as the courts of the rendering state would give it.
The doctrine’s history is instructive, even though it lies in relatively scanty legislative
history, in meager statutory law, and in meandering case law. The Full Faith and Credit Clause,
according to recent scholarship, originally dealt only with the evidential effect of sister-state acts,
records, and judicial proceedings.50 The clause thus meant to ensure that a judgment would serve
as evidence in another state, broadly leaving any other effect of the judgment to congressional
legislation. The term “full” in the clause meant, in the prevailing parlance, that the judgment
would be admissible as sufficient or prima facie evidence; thus, a plaintiff seeking enforcement
could introduce a valid and final foreign judgment to show there was presumptively a judgment
debt, but the defendant could then induce full and free reexamination of the merits of the claim to
show no debt was owing; this approach accorded with the treatment then given to foreign-nation
judgments. In short, the clause’s intention was that congressional implementation of the
constitutional provision would be necessary to impose a binding effect, as opposed to this merely
evidential effect.
Congress therefore has broad discretion as to the effects of sister-state acts, records, and
judicial proceedings.51 Although it has not exercised its power often, it did so almost
immediately, seemingly giving the states’ judgments conclusive effect by means of the last
sentence in the 1790 statute.52 The Supreme Court so read the statute in 1813.53 Courts came to
view the statute as requiring the same effect as the judgment had in the rendering state.
Starting in the later 1800s, however, “intellectual slippage” as to the difference between
the clause and the statute led to a considerable power grab by the judiciary at the expense of
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legislative discretion.54 Without realizing what it was doing, the Court came to read the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as itself dictating conclusive effect of judgments, leaving to the
legislature a power to create exceptions.55 And that view prevails in the courts of today.
This history helps to explain the coverage of the doctrine today. The clause’s reference to
“public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” comprises judgments and all other state
governmental records, including most notably the state’s statutory and decisional law. The sister
state must give “Full Faith and Credit” in its courts and in all its other offices.
The preceding paragraph does not mean, however, that all acts, records, and judicial
proceedings enjoy the same treatment. By virtue of the history, courts must give judgments the
same conclusive effect they have where rendered. This is a strong command. But the courts need
only accept as evidence all that other stuff from another state; likewise, state offices other than
courts must accept as evidence all the governmental records of another state. This is a weak
command.
The most important consequence of this formulation’s bifurcation is the lenient constraint
from full faith and credit on choice of law. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal
Constitution in a way that gives American courts a very free hand in choosing the governing law
and, in particular, in choosing to apply their own law to nonlocal events.56 Courts continue to
recognize this basic distinction between respect for judgments and choice of law: a strong
command as to the former and a weak one as to the latter. (Note that they can manage to do so
only by ignoring the fact that the last sentence of § 1738 today carelessly lumps together the
treatment of records of judicial proceedings and of “Acts.”)
In describing the doctrine’s coverage, however, I should not skip over the threshold
question of what “judgments” means. The word includes court judgments, of course. It does not
include arbitration awards, unless a court has confirmed the award. That is, neither the clause nor
the statute compels the forum court to respect a bare arbitral decision.
As to administrative agency adjudications, other than those upheld via a court judgment,
they are outside the language of § 1738, which reaches only “court” judgments. One could still
argue that administrative adjudications fall within the broader language of the constitutional
clause.57 Or one could take the view that they, not being “judicial proceedings,” do not come
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within the clause’s command concerning judgments.58 Unfortunately, the Court’s messy cases on
point leave the matter open: it is possible that the clause reaches some quasi-judicial proceedings
of court-like administrative tribunals.59
Nevertheless, judicially unreviewed administrative determinations and judicially
unconfirmed arbitration awards often get respect in the courts of a different jurisdiction. Recall
that when full faith and credit does not compel recognition or enforcement, the second court can,
unless prohibited by some federal statute, still choose as a matter of comity to give the same
effect to a valid and final judgment as the rendering state would. But such recognition and
enforcement flow usually from the second sovereign’s conflict of laws doctrine, which can
choose to give effect.60 There is no general obligation to give full faith and credit to nondomestic
nonjudgments.61
The special interest here, however, is the doctrine’s demand for judicial recognition and
enforcement of judgments. It is indeed a strong demand.
A state court will recognize, or in other words give effect under the doctrine of res
judicata to, a sister-state judgment that is valid and final. When the second court faces the
question of whether the prior judgment is valid and final, it should apply the law of the sister
state (which of course is subject to any applicable external restraints, such as due process and
other federal provisions imposed on and becoming part of state law).62 When the second court
faces a question of the extent or reach of res judicata based on the prior judgment, it should apply
the res judicata law that the rendering court would apply (including any applicable external
restraints).63
The doctrine also requires enforcement of a judgment entitled to recognition. A local
sheriff will not enforce a judgment issued by another sovereign, and a local judge cannot directly
enforce a judgment that is not a matter of record in that jurisdiction. Instead, the second
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sovereign will provide some other enforcement procedure that converts the nondomestic
judgment into a domestic record.64 With respect to the method of enforcement, the second court
applies its own law, subject to the proviso that the method should not be so complex or
expensive as to burden unduly the enforcement of nondomestic judgments.65 A usual method of
enforcement of nondomestic judgments is for the plaintiff to initiate in the second jurisdiction an
action upon the prior judgment and thus obtain a regularly enforceable domestic judgment.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the literal import of clause and statute, ways to
escape the obligation to recognize and enforce. For example, the forum court can allow a
challenge to the jurisdiction of the rendering court. There are also narrow exceptions where some
or all of the dictates of full faith and credit do not apply, such as where recognition or
enforcement would so grossly and improperly interfere with the second state’s important
interests as to create a national interest against such recognition or enforcement. One must
distinguish this national interest against recognition or enforcement from the second state’s local
distaste for the nature of the underlying claim. That is, there is no general exception based on the
second state’s public policy,66 and indeed specific examples of a national interest recognized by
the courts are rare.67 Yet the clause expressly authorizes congressional exceptions.68 Thus, in
narrow circumstances grounded on strong federal substantive or procedural policies, federal law
may provide against (or conceivably may augment by statute) recognition or enforcement.
One question that expresses itself intensely here is whether a state court, when within the
clause and the statute, can go beyond giving the same effect and instead give more effect that the
rendering state would give to its own judgments. For example, could the forum state apply its
own, more expansive res judicata law to a sister-state’s judgment?
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Certainly, the clause and statute require F-2 to accord to a valid and final F-1 judgment
“at least the res judicata effect” that it has in F-1.69 No one contends that F-2 can give less effect
to an F-1 judgment than it has in F-1. But whether F-2 can, if its policy permits, give more effect
to an F-1 judgment than it has in F-1 is a question that has not yet received a definitive answer.
Some have suggested that F-2 could do so.70 But most authorities have asserted, to the contrary,
that recognition of a judgment for full faith and credit purposes means giving the judgment “the
same effect that it has in the state where it was rendered.”71
On the one hand, the argument in favor of giving more effect runs like this. Assume that
the F-1 judgment is valid and final, that the F-1 res judicata rule in the situation under discussion
would permit relitigation of the claim or issue, that the F-2 rule would not permit relitigation, and
that the F-2 res judicata rule does not exceed due process or other such constitutional limitations
when applied to F-2 judgments. If F-2 has a significant connection to the parties or to the events
involved in the F-1 litigation, and if the relitigation is to take place in F-2’s court, F-2 is
presumably free to conduct the litigation in accordance with its applicable substantive as well as
procedural law. If F-2 has sufficient connection with the litigation to permit the application of its
substantive law to the claims or issues without violating the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, it would seem to have sufficient connection to apply its res judicata law to
claims or issues relevant in the F-2 action that were previously litigated in F-1. Thus, application
of F-2’s broader preclusion rules is arguably permissible. And, of course, F-2 has interests in
avoiding the burden of relitigation.
On the other hand, if F-2 accords claim preclusion or issue preclusion effects to the F-1
judgment, the result will be a new judgment that will then be entitled to full faith and credit, and
hence res judicata effects, in every other state—even in F-1. The effect of F-2’s last-in-time
application of its own broader res judicata standards could significantly change the future effects
of the F-1 adjudication.72 For instance, if F-2 held that the F-1 judgment was a bar to a later suit
on the claim, the F-2 judgment would then prevent relitigation of the claim even in F-1, under
whose rules the first judgment had not been a bar. Similar permanent effects can result for issues
that had not been regarded as conclusively determined under the res judicata rules of F-1, if F-2’s
judgment precludes relitigation of the issues under F-2’s rules. These oddities necessarily result
from the full-faith-and-credit fact that F-1 does not have the symmetrical power to give F-2’s
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judgment less effect than it has in F-2. So, F-2’s application of its own broader res judicata law
has an unavoidable impact on F-1. Surely, F-1 has significant substantive and procedural
interests in specifying the effects of its own judgments. Arguably, then, F-2’s interest in avoiding
relitigation is insufficient to justify such an impingement on F-1’s interests.
The outcome is not a toss-up, however, because more is at stake than balancing the two
states’ interests. The way to resolve this question is to return to the purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. It meant to give us the benefits of a judicially unified nation. A judgment of F-1
should mean the same thing everywhere within the nation, regardless of whether a person
manages to sue subsequently in a broad or narrow res judicata state. It should further be noted
that 28 U.S.C. § 1738, substantially similar to the statute passed in 1790 to implement the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, provides for the effect to be the “same” as the judgment has in the court
from which it is taken.
Additionally, fairness argues that the parties litigating in F-1 should know then what is at
stake and what any judgment will mean anywhere in the nation.73 A person should know the
detrimental effect of a potential judgment, and the effect should not change with where the
opponent later chooses, perhaps surprisingly, to invoke it.
Even more basically, res judicata is the law that specifies what a judgment decides and
what it does not decide, the law that defines the boundaries of the judgment. What the judgment
does not decide is just as important as what it decides. The boundaries are an intrinsic part of the
judgment. To respect a judgment requires respecting its boundaries. For F-2 to give more effect
to the content of F-1’s judgment than F-1 would give—more rather than the same effect—
necessarily implies that F-2 is giving less effect to the judgment’s boundaries. In short, this
whole question disappears with the realization that no meaningful distinction exists between
more and less effect. Consequently, full faith and credit must require the second court to give the
same effect to the judgment’s content and its boundaries as would the rendering state.
B. Application to Former Adjudication
1. Meaning of Res Judicata Within the Same Jurisdiction
Before turning to the direct implications for civil procedure of the constitutional doctrine,
one should think about that simple but elusive lesson coming indirectly from study of full faith
and credit: res judicata is nothing more or less than the body of law that defines a “judgment.”
After all, a judgment is not merely a concrete embodiment of a court decision. By necessity, a
judgment decides certain things and does not decide other things. Res judicata performs the job
of delineating that real content of a judgment, so defining it by specifying the effects and
noneffects of the decision.
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Res judicata dictates whether decided matters are subject to reopening, as well as which
actually undecided matters nevertheless fall within the bounds of a judgment and so receive
treatment as if decided. It also dictates what lies outside the boundaries of the judgment.
Although res judicata law may appear to be a jumble of arcane rules, it essentially has this
straightforward but profound mission of defining the scope of a prior adjudication. It is good to
remember that res judicata literally means the thing, or matter, adjudged.
Because res judicata specifies what a judgment has and has not adjudicated with binding
effect, this doctrine is of universal importance both practical and systemic. It proves critical in
interpreting any judgment. Accordingly, res judicata is a major and critical topic in the basic lawschool course on civil procedure.
Moreover, res judicata is the doctrine that defines the output of the judicial branch.
Unlike the legislature or the administration, which can act on all citizens, the court acts with
respect to certain matters concerning only the parties before it and a very limited set of others.
Strangers have their right to a day in court. This feature helps to give the judicial branch its
distinctive nature: individualized application of the substantive law before a neutral
decisionmaker in accordance with predetermined procedures, and with limited future effects but
with finality as to those effects.
Let’s get more specific:
(1) Because a judgment, as delineated by res judicata law, is the primary objective of
most adjudicative proceedings, a knowing eye trained on res judicata will greatly affect
the litigant’s implementation of procedure, both way before and way after judgment.
From composing pleadings in the initial lawsuit to settling or otherwise ending that case
and then to attacking the judgment in a second lawsuit, the litigant must bear res judicata
in mind.
(2) Res judicata shores up separation of powers by setting the boundaries on the output of
the judicial branch of government. It is the law that restrains the applicability of judicial
decisions to nonparties and the retroactivity of later legal change to already adjudicated
matters. Because res judicata so determines how a judgment differs from legislation and
administration, the doctrine is of basic importance in understanding the governmental
system.
(3) At a more profound level, res judicata does much more. It is essential to judicial
operation, to the orderly working of the judicial branch. If disputants could just reopen
their adjudicated disputes, there would be no end to litigation, nor any beginning of
judicial authority. Finality is not just an efficient policy, it is a necessary condition for the
existence of a judiciary.
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Given that res judicata plays a key role in procedure, separation of powers, and judicial
operation, it is naturally a difficult subject. Moreover, like any policy, it has its costs as well as
its benefits. As to obvious costs, one readily perceives that litigating about whether to relitigate is
expensive, and some applications of the doctrine do seem outrageously unfair. Often, frustrated
students and other victims of res judicata, after realizing its difficulties and lamenting its costs,
ask whether we would be better off without res judicata. Yet they should acknowledge that this
question is nonsensical in itself. Our legal system could not exist without res judicata. Sure, the
system could lop off some extensions and some details of res judicata. But the essence of res
judicata—its mission of giving an adjudication basic binding effects—is nonoptional. A version
of it must apply to every judgment ever rendered.
This realization informs all sorts of comparative and historical inquiries. Each legal
system generates a res judicata law. “The doctrine of res judicata is a principle of universal
jurisprudence forming part of the legal systems of all civilized nations.”74 The basic message of
res judicata is that at some point the pursuit of truth must and should cease: justice demands that
there be an end to litigation. In order for any nascent judicial system to operate, a decision must
have at least some minimal bindingness. Consequently, around the world every legal system,
from its beginnings, has generated a common core of res judicata law to make adjudications
final.
2. Treatment of Judgments from Other Jurisdictions
As already suggested, the American res judicata rules are obligatory on this country’s
courts when the judgment comes from another American court. The Framers perceived the need
for certainty and uniformity as to the treatment of state judgments, and therefore required
respectful treatment via constitutional clause. That command helps us to realize the benefits of a
unified nation:
The full faith and credit clause is one of the foundation stones upon which our
federal system is constructed. Its obvious purpose is to make available some of the
benefits of a centralized nation by altering “the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties . . . and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout
which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right . . . .”75
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Moreover, the individual’s rights embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause are of obvious
importance to the citizens of a federation:
It was placed foremost among those measures [such as the Privileges and Immunities
Clause] which would guard the new political and economic union against the
disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence, but without aggrandizement of
federal power at the expense of the states.”76
Thus, a judgment for $20 million from a Massachusetts court should be worth that same amount
in California, for reasons of fairness as well as for political and economic reasons.
The very same reasons are at play in the interjurisdictional contexts other that a state
court’s treatment of a sister-state judgment. The basic approach to all judgments therefore is
retroverse, in the sense of turning backward to look at the rendering court’s view of its own
judgment. The second court lets the first court’s law decide what it conclusively adjudicated.77
Again, the more specific implications merit consideration:
(1) Res judicata implies at least some respect for prior adjudication across legal systems
linked by federalism, vertical as well as horizontal. Without such respect, the more
powerful courts would inevitably extinguish their competitors. If disputants could reopen
their disputes in the superior court, they would come to skip over the inferior court. The
royal courts in England prevailed over the local courts in part because of their willingness
to allow litigation anew.78 Contrariwise, the continued thriving of federal and state courts
in the United States is owing to a healthy doctrine of res judicata.
(2) On the level of international law, res judicata might not be absolutely necessary. The
law of the jungle might work, because each nation has a zone of autonomous operation.
or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of
the state of its origin.’” (quoting Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277
(1935))).
76
Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1945); see id. at 33 (“The Federal Government stands to gain little at the
expense of the states through any application of it. Anything taken from a state by way of
freedom to deny faith and credit to law of others is thereby added to the state by way of a right to
exact faith and credit for its own.”).
77
See ALI, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 4 (2006); Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign
Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 70-76 (1984).
78
See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 22-27 (4th ed. 2002).

35
But especially today, with ever-increasing globalization, a sensible international order
requires an international law on the application of res judicata. The United States should
and does respect the judgments of France, and vice versa.
(3) Any steps toward establishing any such regime of full faith and credit for
nondomestic judgments depends on providing assurance that the rendering court’s legal
system is worthy of respect. A guarantee of due process in the rendering court would do
the trick.
Within the American system, the applicability of the Due Process Clause now performs
the necessary work of ensuring respect-worthy judgments. With peace of mind, F-2 can give full
faith and credit to F-1’s judgment, because F-2 knows that the parties could ensure that F-1
delivered due process, both substantively and procedurally: F-1 did not overreach in exercising
territorial jurisdiction, and F-1 employed fundamentally fair procedures—otherwise, the U.S.
Supreme Court would have been empowered to step in.
On the international stage, things are trickier. There might be no supreme court, and there
might be no due process clause anyway that is applicable internationally. So comity is the best
approach we can hope for. To establish a more demanding system, there would have to be a
treaty mechanism to restrict exorbitant jurisdiction at least, if not also to create an assurance of
fundamental fairness.
The principal European countries appear to have taken such steps on the treatment of
some foreign judgments. The European Union concluded a treaty called the Brussels Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, which in 2002 morphed into a EU regulation.79 By it, the member states agreed to
provide virtually automatic recognition and enforcement of the judgments of the other member
states. This provision was like the full faith and credit provisions in the United States. In order to
make this agreement acceptable, the Convention was a “double convention” that also defined the
bases of territorial jurisdiction. The agreement on jurisdiction worked as the due process
provisions do in the United States. The European member states could give respect to the others’
judgments because they knew that the Convention restricted the others to appropriately limited
jurisdictional reach. Today, there is in effect a supreme court too. The European Court of Justice
exercises supranational authority, overseeing the national courts, to decide questions under the
Brussels Regulation. All this makes the current times exciting in Europe, as the ECJ actively
works out the details, much as the Marshall Court united the American judicial systems two
centuries ago.
Americans, however, are being whipsawed by the European approach. Not only are they
still subject (in theory) to the far-reaching jurisdiction of European courts and the wide
recognition and enforceability of the resulting European judgments, but also U.S. judgments tend
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(in practice) to receive short shrift in European courts. The overall international situation, as
exacerbated by the Brussels Regulation, is untenable in the long run for the United States.
Therefore, in 1992 the United States initiated a push to conclude a worldwide convention on
respect for judgments, acting through the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Pragmatically speaking, jurisdiction is the doctrine that would serve almost alone in ensuring
adjudicative restraint. Drafting and agreeing to such a multilateral convention on jurisdiction and
judgments could yield great returns for the United States. But so far the negotiators have not had
great success in hammering out a worldwide understanding on due process and full faith and
credit.80

V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The study of complex litigation starts to come back to procedure in the strict sense of the
mechanics of the civil process. The big idea here concerns procedures that use the justification of
adequate representation to extend the binding effects of a judgment to persons largely playing the
role of nonparties. Although procedural law puts severe limits on such extension, the
Constitution puts an absolute but distant limit on how far law can extend the binding effects. To
perceive that outer limit, the focus must shift to procedural due process.81
A. Constitutional Doctrine
In the Constitution, due process of law is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, applicable
to the federal government, and by the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to state governments.
These guarantees say that the federal and state governments cannot deprive any person “of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
The sparsely worded Due Process Clauses have been interpreted to contain substantive as
well as procedural components. Substantive due process protects from governmental
infringement the fundamental rights “implicit in ordered liberty,” including those such as privacy
that are not covered by some other constitutional provision like the Equal Protection Clause.
Procedural due process embodies the notion of “fundamental fairness.” Substantive due process
what the government can do, while procedural due process establishes a floor for how it must
proceed when depriving someone of life, liberty, or property.82
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Substantive due process has a sorry history of judicial overstepping that has made it
controversial and leaves it rather restricted today. The most prominent appearance of substantive
due process in connection with civil procedure is the constitutional law of territorial jurisdiction.
Much of that law about the limits on a state’s adjudicating with respect to out-of-staters rests on
the substantive part of the Due Process Clause. Procedural due process is much more prominent
in civil procedure, because it aims to assure a basically fair procedure when the government acts.
For example, to authorize governmental action significantly impairing a person’s protected
interest, procedural due process normally requires adequate notification and the opportunity to be
heard at proceedings before a neutral decisionmaker.83
Another way to categorize rights is to distinguish those that are more or less absolute as a
formal matter from those that are subject to balancing against countervailing considerations
including direct costs. Most rights protected by substantive due process tend to be spoken of as
absolute rights, ones that trump most other considerations. But the protection of procedural due
process is definitely subject to being balanced away.84
The judicial approach to procedural due process is to ascertain first that an interest in life,
liberty, or property is at stake. More than mere expectations or other unprotected interests must
be at stake to trigger a right to any process at all.85 Then, if the interest is a protected one, the
court must determine what process is due. The way to answer this second question is to ask if the
requested safeguard is essential to fairness, all things considered. The result is a constitutional
test that is vague, but at least is realistic and reasonable.
The Supreme Court, in the second step of defining exactly what kind of hearing the
Constitution requires in a lawsuit—or in deciding whether to require any other procedural
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safeguard—has come to use a cost-benefit analysis that accommodates the competing concerns.86
The Court dictates consideration of (1) the value, or importance, of the interest at stake; (2) the
probability of an erroneous deprivation if the procedural safeguard in question is not provided;
and (3) the cost of, or the burden imposed by, that safeguard. Upon combining and balancing
those three concerns, good policy would require the safeguard when the risk of harm without the
safeguard exceeds the safeguard’s cost.
However, I am speaking here of a constitutional requirement. The Due Process Clauses
dictate the minimally fair process that the government must provide when impairing a person’s
property or liberty interest. The lawmaking architects build a law of civil procedure that delivers
much more “good” than mere due process. They seek thereby to achieve optimal policies and
rules, above the constitutional floor. The Constitution requires no more than a minimum. Thus,
the risk of harm would have to considerably exceed the cost before amounting to a constitutional
violation, rather than merely bad policy. Such deference seems especially appropriate in this
setting where courts are weighing the largely unmeasurable and incommensurable in order to
second-guess the legislature or its delegatee. Therefore, procedural due process will require the
safeguard only when the risk of harm without the safeguard substantially exceeds the safeguard’s
cost.
An economist would rephrase the Court’s approach by comparing the expected error cost
(the product of the probability of error without the safeguard, Pe , times the cost of error if it
occurs, Ce) with the direct cost of the government’s providing the safeguard, Cd . To sum up,
procedural due process requires the safeguard if and only if:
Pe Ce >> Cd .
This economic approach is less opaque and more rigorous than the Court’s. Also, the
economic approach opens the door to defining costs more inclusively, so that process-based
concerns, such as fostering participation by parties to serve the ultimate goal of process
legitimacy, can count. Still, both approaches remain controversial. Trying to define “due
process” requires some hubris, and all the more so to put it in terms of costs and benefits.
Nonetheless, employing a balancing test does not imply that every procedural due
process question ends up being addressed ad hoc on a case-by-case basis. By balancing, prior
cases could have generated a “rule” that applies in a particular context across a range of cases.
For example, there is a rule of procedural due process against constructive notice of a lawsuit to
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the parties, so that mailed notice of a hearing must be sent to anyone significantly affected whose
identity and whereabouts are reasonably knowable.87
B. Application to Complex Litigation
1. Privity
The conclusory label of privy describes people who were nonparties to an action but who
in certain circumstances are nevertheless subjected to generally the same rules of res judicata as
are the former parties.88 Procedural due process is concerned with the substance of fundamental
fairness: the full and fair day in court. Does that mean that due process forbids binding by
judgment persons other than parties?
The answer, of course, is no. Due process is not violated merely because a nonparty is
held bound. Actually, such preclusion is common. For instance, a beneficiary may be bound on
issues litigated by the trustee or executor.89 Or, once an issue relating to an interest in real
property has been fully litigated between the title owner and another party, the issue is settled
against later purchasers or devisees as well.90 Thus, any constitutionally required opportunity to
be heard may come via devices other than the formal joinder of every person to be affected by
the judgment, now or forever.
The way to explain the reality of nonparty preclusion passes first through the recognition
that the question is not one of substantive due process, whereby the claim to a day in court or to
litigant autonomy could morph into an absolute right. Instead, the question is a matter of
procedural due process, making the appropriate approach a balancing test. Taking the whole
range of outcome-based and process-based interests into account, that test makes an opportunity
to be heard an essential safeguard of adjudicatory procedure, but not the opportunity to be heard
in person. The opportunity can come through representation by a party, if that task is performed
adequately well.91
Another way to phrase the test of procedural due process is that it will allow binding of
nonparties unless the costs substantially outweigh the benefits. This balance has worked out in
this context to generate the “rule” that due process guarantees only a full and fair day in court
enjoyed in person or through a decent representative.
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Nonparty preclusion therefore does not contravene the Constitution when some sort of
representational relationship existed between a former party and the nonparty. After all, the
demands of due process are loose enough to allow the legislature and administrators to bind
people and their property, when those people have received representation only in a weak sense.
Analogously, a court’s judgment would be constitutionally capable of binding, among others, all
similarly situated persons whose interests received “adequate representation,” binding them not
only through the flexible doctrine of stare decisis as it already does but also through the strictures
of res judicata as it could. Admittedly, because the constitutional test ultimately turns on the
adequacy of the former party’s representation of the nonparty, calibrated in a way appropriate to
the adjudicatory context of individualized application of the substantive law, it will remain a
vague standard.
In sum, all that due process guarantees is a full and fair day in court enjoyed in person or
through an adequate representative. Without that qualification, the right to a “day in court” is
but a misleading slogan.92 With that qualification, it becomes apparent that due process would
allow binding many more nonparties than most persons assume.
True, many judges and commentators utter broad statements to the effect that due process
forbids binding nonparties. The more careful among them admit that their statement is subject to
exceptions. My contrary suggestion is that the exceptions prove that due process commands no
such thing. Instead, it is subconstitutional law that normally requires a day in court before
binding nonparties, thereby creating the illusion of due process’s day-in-court rule.
Society has indeed chosen, as expressed in its res judicata law, to go much less far in
binding nonparties by judgment than it constitutionally could. Mere representation of the
nonparty’s interests, however adequate, does not suffice for the subconstitutional lawmakers. It
is their restraint that helps sharply to distinguish adjudication from the rest of governmental
decisionmaking.
So the task undertaken by the maker of subconstitutional law is to specify which
nonparties to consider privies for purposes of res judicata. To induce that choice, some
substantial reasons in policy must exist to bind a nonparty, and those reasons must outweigh the
social costs of binding a nonparty. Then, for the various kinds of nonparties who thereby become
potential candidates for binding, the law tries to draw a set of clear, simple, and rigid rules that
together approximate that balancing of benefits and costs.93
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The resulting res judicata law binds only those nonparties rather closely related to the
representative party.94 There must be representation plus something else. That something might
be a special procedural relationship ensuring alignment and protection of interests (or some sort
of affirmative conduct signifying consent to representation) or a sufficient substantive
relationship implying at least some sort of representational role. This current law represents how
far we as a society have chosen to go, not how far we could go.95
2. Class Action
Privies include persons who were actually represented in the litigation by a party, thus
including class-action members represented by their class representative pursuant to the pertinent
procedural rule, be it Federal Rule 23 or a state provision. Thus, at the back end, res judicata is
the law that gives binding effect to valid class-action judgments.96
Similar considerations govern the front end, affecting how the Constitution and the
lawmakers control the joinder device itself. The class-action device can pursue society’s
efficiency and substantive goals consistently with the fairness notion of having one’s day in
court, as long as the essential due process requirement of adequate representation is met. For
constitutional adequacy in the class-action context, the represented person need only have been
in actual agreement, generally although not necessarily as to all details, with the objectives on
the merits of the representative, who vigorously and competently pursued those objectives as a
party.97 Indeed, because the adequacy standard will vary with the particular context, it might
demand less in the cohesive actions fitting within Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) than in the merely
efficient class actions under Rule 23(b)(3).
Nonetheless, society has chosen, as expressed in its class-action provisions, to go much
less far in binding nonparties by judgment than it constitutionally could. That is, society tolerates
only certain class actions. The helpful image here is of a due process hurdle that is quite low.
Above it, in Rule 23(a) and (b), the rulemakers have built a screen for the federal courts that
allows through only a select set of cases that satisfy society’s policy desires. That is, Rule 23 and
its related case law attempt to create a pragmatic screening device, which lets through all the
cases most clearly appropriate for class-action treatment—those cases that generously realize the
goal of efficiency or the rulemakers’ rather limited substantive goals and that also amply satisfy
fairness concerns—but only those cases.
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First, the law goes further than procedural due process, trying to comfortably ensure
adequacy of representation at the outset of a class action by the scrutiny of a demanding classcertification process under Rule 23. Second, society has chosen to allow class actions to include
only those designated nonparties who are related to the representative party in certain ways: the
extra relationship required by Rule 23 is either that the absentees share common and thus aligned
substantive interests with their representatives or that the former somehow consented to
representation by the latter. Third, Rule 23 also imposes other management limits and
protections to alleviate the obvious dangers of overwhelming the court and the parties and of
disadvantaging the absent class members. This current law so represents how far we as a society
have chosen to go, not how far we could go.
The front end and the back end interconnect. When the class-action judgment is invoked
in subsequent litigation as res judicata, it is subject to attack on the usual limited grounds of
jurisdiction and the like. But an absent class member should also be able to attack its binding
effect on him by raising the constitutional question of inadequate representation of his interests.
Although the absentee should not be able to collaterally attack on the ground of erroneous classcertification in violation of Rule 23, the ground of constitutionally inadequate representation falls
literally under the heading of procedural due process as a permissible ground for attack, as well
as within the spirit of later undoing fundamental defects in fairness but only those defects.98
The lesson here is that although procedural due process may demand less than many
people assume, it still may demand more than some would wish. Many pressures push toward
aggregate treatment of today’s massive cases.99 But due process does, and should, put a limit on
how far the would-be reformers can go in their pursuit of efficient disposition.100
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Put these big ideas together, and the student will understand the legal system and also the
law of civil procedure. A vision of a procedural architecture erected within the constitutional
structure can serve as an exceedingly effective organizational theme for the subject.

